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Accounting for the alignment of interest and commitment in interfirm 
transactional relationships 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Control in interfirm transactional relationships has, inter alia, the purpose of mitigating potential 
opportunistic behaviour. For an individual actor the power-base to exercise control over the 
(output of) the behaviour of another actor in the relationship is a contractual arrangement. From a 
contractual perspective control systems are designed, thus providing contractual instruments to 
align interests and to prevent future opportunistic behaviour from occurring. Transaction cost 
economics proves to be a powerful tool for designing these instruments, which from this 
theoretical perspective are based on ‘credible commitments’ and ‘credible exit threats’. The paper 
argues that the design and potential use of these instruments are efficient in the presence of the 
legitimate mistrust for which they have to compensate.   
However, given fundamental uncertainty, these designs do not suffice in attenuating opportunism 
and have to be complemented by trust building. Drawing on insights from cognitive social 
psychology and sociology, the paper clarifies that in self-regulating processes of rational 
interaction guided by a principle of enlightened self-interest, trust is built via mutual relational 
signalling. Partners voluntarily and deliberately signal to each other that they are trustworthy. The 
paper argues and gives evidence that instrumental control system design embedded in an 
institutional environment and atmosphere is a necessary flank for a trust building process to work 
properly.  
The (interrelated) roles of accounting in a contractual realm as well as in self-regulating processes 
of relational signalling are examined.  
 
Key words: 
Accounting, control, trust, instrumental design, relational signalling 
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Accounting for the alignment of interest and commitment in interfirm 
transactional relationships 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ever since Otley observed that “ the scope of the activity of management control is enlarged and 
it no longer confines within the legal boundaries of the organization” (Otley, 1994, p. 293) and 
Hopwood urged “the examination of some of the accounting and informational consequences of 
more explicit concerns with the management of the supply chain and a more conscious 
questioning of what activities reside within and without the enterprise” (Hopwood, 1996, p. 590) 
a number of studies have been conducted: e.g. Franses & Garnsey, 1996; Gietzmann, 1996; Seal 
et al., 1999; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Anderson, Glenn & Sedatole, 2000; 
Mouritsen, Hansen & Hansen, 2001; Tomkins, 2001; Dekker, 2003; Van den Boogaard & Speklé  
2003; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Seal, Berry & Cullen, 2004;  Hakansson & Lind, 2004; 
Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004.  
From different perspectives these studies examine the roles of accounting, control and trust in 
interfirm transactional relationships. For instance, performance measurement and management 
systems, sanction budgeting, target costing and open book accounting have been proved to play 
more or less important roles in collaborative partnerships and long-term interfirm relationships. 
Accounting serves coordination requirements as well as appropriation concerns (Dekker, 2004), 
the latter being associated with potential opportunism in transactional relationships. In a similar 
vein, most of the studies indicate that trust (in many different forms and stemming from many 
different sources) is at least of some importance. In uncertain situations where it is difficult to 
plan the required activities and output and measure the realized activities and output, relying on a 
trustworthy relationship becomes more important (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; 
Tomkins, 2001). 
However, until now the studies fail to fully explore the way in which trust is built at the level of 
the relationship (the how of the trust building process), and, more importantly, the role that 
accounting information plays in this process. Furthermore, although the links between trust, 
(accounting) information and control have been questioned (e.g. Tomkins, 2001; Langfield-Smith 
and Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004) there is hardly any theory on how formal controls relate to trust 
building processes.   
 
This paper contributes to the existing knowledge by trying to fill up this research gap. 
Concentrating on the potential functions of accounting information, control and trust in mitigating 
opportunism, it makes a clear distinction between a contractual perspective from which 
contractual instrumental design (embedded in a wider institutional environment and atmosphere) 
as a base for the use of control systems is illuminated and a process perspective from which self-
regulating, cognitive trust building processes become visible. We argue that in practice 
instrumental design and self-regulating processes are not substitutes for each other, but that 
instrumental design necessarily has to ‘flank’ trust building processes. Instrumental design in 
combination with safeguards in the wider institutional environment has to compensate for 
legitimate mistrust; once the right instruments are in place, the right cognitive ‘frames’ of the 
partners can induce a level of trust that impedes opportunism to emerge in the course of the 
relationship.  Particularly, the role of accounting in trust building processes is examined. 
Moreover, we explore how this trust building process relates to the more formal accounting and 
control systems as they are designed in a contractual realm.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In a second section by drawing on new institutional economics 
we will provide a deeper theoretical uinderstanding of instrumental design of controls in interfirm 
transactional relationships. Transaction cost economics (TCE) offers a comprehensive framewrok 
for (the understanding of) an efficient design of controls and governance structures.  In a third 
section the usefulness of a TCE-analysis for the understanding of the roles of accounting in 
controlling an interfirm relationship is clarified by making reference to the extant management 
accounting literature. 
However, TCE has been criticised for its underemphasis on process (e.g. Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996; Mahnke, 2001). Given uncertainty and complexity, it is acknowledged that an 
understanding of decision procedures as they gradually show through actors’ behaviours is 
essential. Therefore, in a fourth section the paper addresses the questions as to why and how a 
rational actor deliberately and voluntarily copes with temptations for opportunistic behaviour as 
they emerge in the course of the relationship.  Furthermore, this section clarifies the mechanism 
by which an actor is stimulated to signal his non-opportunistic behaviour to other actors in the 
relationship, thus signalling trustworthy behaviour.  In doing so it will explain that trust is built in 
self-regulating interactive processes. In a fifth section the role of accounting in trust building is 
theorized and evidence on the role of accounting in trust building is given. This evidence is drawn 
from case studies presented in the existing accounting literature.  
Next, a sixth section explores linkages between instrumental design as it is embedded in an 
institutional environment and atmosphere at the one hand and trust building at the level of the 
relationship at the other hand.  Furthermore, it relates instrumental design and trust building to 
operational control. In a seventh section we explain and refine our main case proposition 
regarding the roles of accounting in the management control of interfirm transactional 
relationships. Furthermore, the main contributions to the development of a more general ‘theory 
of the interaction between trust and information’ (Tomkins, 2001) are outlined. Finally, some 
overall conclusions are drawn and a discussion is raised.  
 
 
2. A new institutional economics perspective: an instrumental design approach towards 
opportunism 
 
Contractual arrangements form a power-base for the use of management control systems in a 
transactional relationship. Transactions cost economics (TCE) as an important branch of new 
institutional economics offer a sound theoretical base for a contractual perspective on the 
management control of interfirm transactional relationships. Swierenga and Waterhouse (1982), 
Spicer and Ballew (1983) and Spicer (1988) were among the first to introduce transaction cost 
economics in the management control discipline. Recently Speklé (2001) explored the (potential) 
contribution from TCE to the understanding of management control in a broad sense (within as 
well as between organisations).  He proposes  "a framework that explicates the link between 
various archetypical configurations of control devices and the activities they are expected to 
control" (Speklé, 2001, p. 419). Covaleski et. al  (2003) extend the contribution of transaction 
cost economics within the management control literature. While acknowledging that an important 
focus of TCE is on informing control structure choice that serves purposive control over 
transactions in (and between) organizations, their analysis emphasises the significance of changes 
in the institutional environment on purposive control structure choice. From these papers it 
follows that both the characteristics of the transactional relationships and the (changes in the) 
institutional environment play their roles in purposive control structure choice.  
 
In this paper we will particularly draw on Williamson’s important contributions to TCE 
(Williamson, 1985; 1993; 1996; 2000).  One of the central notions in his analysis is opportunism. 
According to Williamson actors in a transactional relation could behave opportunistically. When 
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they do so, they are ‘seeking self-interest with guile’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 46).  Opportunism is 
associated with behavioural risks: the willingness to lie, to cheat and to harm the other. 
Transaction cost economics assumes that these behavioural risks can be calculated beforehand. 
Subsequently, out of a set of known instruments or solutions a choice can be made in advance, in 
order to mitigate these behavioural risks. These instruments or solutions will be described in the 
contract in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour from occurring. 
So, the possibility of opportunism from the side of the other party is a risk that can be calculated 
beforehand. To the extent that parties do not think it economically justified to design contractual 
solutions for calculable potential opportunism they apparently decide to trust each other 
(Coleman, 1990).  In this view, trust is an asset, which is conceived as accepted calculated risk; 
the potential benefits of expected cooperative behaviour exceed potential costs of expected  
opportunism (Gambetta, 1988; Coleman, 1990).  Calculated risk is subordinate to self-interest: an 
actor will trust his interaction partner when he estimates that it is in his partner’s interest to 
respect the agreement, and he honours his partner’s trust because it is in his interest to do so. In 
Williamson’s opinion (Williamson, 1993) this notion of trust is redundant, because it adds 
nothing to the more precise concept of ‘calculated risk’. He suggests a moratorium on the term in 
the domain of economic transactions which are calculative and governed by self-interest and to 
only use it in the domain of personal ties, where trust occurs in a ‘deep’ sense of ‘human passion’ 
(Dunn, 1988, p. 74) and where it tries to suppress calculative ness. So, in Williamson’s opinion 
trust and calculativeness belong to distinct relational areas.  
 
Risks of opportunism can take various forms.  
First, there is a risk of opportunistic entry to the transactional relationship. The potential supplier 
can, for instance, give wrong or imprecise information about his competencies or his past 
experiences, while the potential buyer can give wrong or imprecise information about the 
conditions under which the supplier has to perform.  
Second, there is a risk of opportunistic execution of the agreement. A scenario used by 
Williamson may serve as an example. Suppose a transactional relation in which the supplier has 
to invest in specific assets lasts at least for two periods. In the first period the contracts are 
written, the orders are placed and the transaction-specific investments are made. The production 
is in the second period, the supplier will start production after the buyer confirms the order and 
realizes his demand. It is clear that in such a situation the supplier would like a hostage (a 
compensation) to be agreed upon before the agreement is made, given the necessity to invest in 
specific assets and the uncertainty of the buyer not realizing his demand. He would not think it is 
fair to bear all the risks. There are three possibilities: either the buyer refuses to give hostages, 
then the case is closed; or he is willing to post a hostage and an agreement is made; or he 
promises to keep his word, without posting a hostage, in which case the supplier will run a severe 
risk of potential opportunism.  
Third, there is the risk of a private use of confidential information.  Suppliers might realistically 
fear a spillover-effect: the buyer could leak their know-how via his network to the supplier’s 
competitors (Blumberg, 2001). On their parts, buyers might fear the emergence of new 
competitors (Blumberg, 2001). Quinn and Hilmer (1994, p. 89) give the example of the US bike 
manufacturer Schwinn who outsourced its frame manufacturing to Giant, a then relatively 
unknown supplier of frames. After acquiring the knowledge necessary to produce frames, Giant 
decided to become a bike manufacturer itself and thus to become a competitor of Schwinn, who 
never grew out of its marginal role.  
Fourth, there is a risk of an opportunistic exit from the transactional relationship (Blumberg, 
2003). As Blumberg (2001) referring to Stafford (1994) is suggesting, an opportunistic exit from 
an alliance can, for instance, occur when one of the parties does not think it to be in his own 
interest if the other party chooses to also enter in transactional relationships with parties that are 
considered to be competitors of the leaving party.   
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The creation of a power-base for preventing various forms of opportunistic behaviour from 
occurring (i.e. a contractual arrangement) not only presupposes the ability to anticipate 
behavioural risks. It also presupposes the actors’ willingness to create such a power-base. 
Rational actors considering entering a long-term economic relationship have to find it reasonable 
that potential solutions are written down. They should experience reasonable fears that out of the 
pursuit of well-understood self-interest potential partners will behave opportunistically and, 
therefore, will take economic advantage of the relationship. Therefore, an ‘ex ante’ mistrust of 
certain implicit or explicit promises of an actor (such as in the example given above) involved 
could be legitimate. More generally speaking, mistrust is legitimate when third parties that do not 
hold any stake in the relationship would say that any person put in the specific situation would 
mistrust certain explicit or implicit promises made by one of the parties. This is irrespective of the 
‘true’ intention of the promisor when he makes his promise, as it is “blatantly against his self-
interest” (Lindenberg, 2000, p. 12). The mistrusting party then can claim the necessity of putting 
in position instruments that foster mutual cooperation by reducing opportunities and incentives 
for opportunism and/or by compensating a firm’s loss if opportunism nevertheless occurs, 
without running the risk of being accused of abnormal risk aversion or lack of good faith 
(Lindenberg, 2000, p. 12).  
An explicit design and potential use of instruments that safeguard against opportunism that can be 
anticipated in advance does not in any way harm the relationship and is even desirable, because it 
fosters mutual cooperation. As the legitimacy of the instruments is directly connected to the 
pursuit of well-understood self-interest, the instruments aim at interest alignment, a process in 
which “incentives are changed in such a way that breach would not be blatantly in the self-
interest of the promisor” (Lindenberg, 2000, p. 12). Within transaction cost economics, alignment 
of interest is to a great extent taken care of by credible commitments (Williamson, 1983). 
 
Weesie and Raub (1996) classify credible commitments into four categories. First, actors can 
decide to shift control to third parties, who do not have an incentive to behave unfairly to either 
one of the actors involved. In doing so, actors commit themselves to arbitration in the case of a 
conflict. Second, actors can restrict their own set of behavioural alternatives. Examples of these 
are secrecy agreements as well as exclusivity assurances such as the guarantee not to enter the 
home market of the partner (Blumberg, 2001, p. 827). Third, actors can balance information 
asymmetries. The more informed actor provides (unrestricted) access to his information sources 
such as financial information systems. Fourth, actors can decide to modify the costs and benefits 
associated with certain behaviour. For instance, they can decide that a contractor acting in the 
interest of the outsourcer gets a financial bonus, whereas acting against the interest of the 
outsourcer, for instance, by delayed or poor performance, results in a financial penalty.  
 
The specific instruments for which actors opt can be written down in a contract. Contractual 
clauses enable each actor to commit each other to partial control by other actors (Chung, 1995; 
Ghemawat, 1991). In order to entirely assure an effective solution for any opportunistic potential, 
contracts have to be complete, explicit and easily enforceable (Blumberg, 2001). But of course, in 
many cases writing these types of contracts is impossible because of complexity and uncertainty. 
Therefore, contracts are almost always incomplete and only partly explicit. This has consequences 
for the enforceability, especially if third parties as courts or arbiters get involved (Kreps, 1990). 
Contracts that are ambiguous with regard to the effects of non-compliance are hard to enforce 
(Blumberg, 2001). Therefore, incompleteness, inexplicitness and non-enforceability limit the 
meaning of contracts (Macaulay, 1963). Furthermore, designing, and implementing satisfactory 
contracts is costly (Blumberg, 2001). Efficiency-seeking behaviour in structuring the control of 
interfirm relationships will, therefore, imply a thorough ‘ex ante’ assessment of possible 
commitments.  
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In sum, transaction cost economics offers an ‘ex ante’ ‘calculative choice’ perspective on the 
structuring of control in interfirm relationships. These relationships are structured by farsighted 
contracting.  The notion of ‘farsightedness’ enables access to “one of the most important ‘tricks’ 
in the economist’s bag, namely the assumption that economic actors have the ability to look 
ahead, to discern problems and prospects, and factor these back into organizational/contractual 
design” (Williamson, 1993, p. 129). These farsighted contracts provide solutions for anticipated 
opportunism, in order to minimise the necessity to find solutions for problems that derive ‘ex 
post’ (e.g. after actors entered into the transactional relationship). Potential opportunistic 
behaviour is considered to be the main control problem in interfirm transactional relationships. 
The main instruments to solve this control problem are credible commitments, which primarily 
serve to align interests of the actors involved and that can rest upon a bureaucratic mechanism or 
upon a market mechanism. Credible commitments are written down in contracts. Because of 
complexity and uncertainty, many contracts are necessarily incomplete and inexplicit, leading to 
non-enforceability, which in turn limits the importance/meaning of contractual arrangements. As 
a consequence of the ‘calculative nature’ of the choices, trust is viewed as a redundant concept.  
In contrast, the term mistrust seems to fit well with transaction cost economics. Legitimate 
mistrust is the basis for an explicit and efficient design and potential use of credible 
commitments.  
 
The social and institutional embeddedness of contractual arrangements 
 
The contractual arrangements are embedded in a wider institutional environment and atmosphere 
that can at least partly compensate for necessary incompleteness of contracts or that can 
economise on the contractual arrangements.  The first ‘ring’ of this environment is the social 
network to which an actor belongs. This social network can be viewed as a business group of 
agents that interact on a regular basis. Social networks are especially helpful in mitigating the risk 
of opportunistic entry into a relationship. Various scholars (Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986; 
Lyons, 1996; Uzzi, 1996) point to their role in information processing and in increasing the 
credibility of the information. These properties of social networks also have reputation effects, as 
the members of the network are well informed about the members’ past and present behaviour 
and whether it is in accordance with the norms of co-operation and social customs defined in the 
network. This makes the identification of potential suitable partners easier, and thus works as a 
selection mechanism (Chaserant, 2003). Reputation effects based on information from social 
networks have their shortcomings, as the parties themselves have to experience how to co-operate 
in the specific transactional situation. Therefore, if the parties have had previous experiences with 
transactional relationships they are better able to evaluate the suitability of each other in a new 
relationship. Gulati (1995) shows how repeated transactions between the same partners facilitate 
the establishment of new relationships. The partners know each other’s way of acting, have an 
insight into each other’s competences, and know how individuals behave. Larson (1992) 
described the importance of reputations both of companies and individuals based on a history of 
personal relations and individual friendship for the formation of long-term relationships. Prior 
reputations reduce uncertainty and establish expectations. Moreover, repeated transactions make 
it possible to make use of already established ways of information processing and 
communicating, and of procedures for co-ordinating the activities. To develop such systems, 
procedures and people interfaces is a matter of trial and error and costs time. 
 
At a more aggregate level the firm and the social network are embedded in a wider institutional 
environment, consisting of markets, the law, values and norms etc. In addition to the role social 
networks can play the institutional environment can serve as a source for trust, i.e. institution-
based trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Institution-based trust is based on elements out of the 
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institutional environment the relationship is subject to, such as legal forms, forms of certification 
and social norms and values. It is a form of trust that moves into the interfirm transactional 
relationship from the outside. Contractual instrumental design is embedded in this type of trust. 
The quality of governmental regulations, how they are maintained, the role they play in the 
business world, and the influence of other regulatory bodies determine the trustworthiness of the 
institutional environment in which the transactions are embedded. These regulations and 
legislations establish a common framework and specific rules governing transactions (Luhmann, 
1979; Zucker, 1986; Bachmann, 2001). The same can be said about the rules and norms accepted 
in social networks the parties are part of (Lorenz, 1999).  Therefore, membership of social 
networks as well as institution-based trust has the potential to economize on transaction costs 
associated with instrumental design.  
Both phenomena (the membership of social networks as well as the existence of institution-based 
trust) could enable an actor to opt for voice and/or exit threats. In the case of a voice threat an 
actor threatens to ruin his partner’s reputation. In the case of an exit threat an actor threatens to 
exit from the relationship. The credibility of these threats is dependent on the institutional context 
(network embeddedness, wider institutional environment and atmosphere) of the contractual 
arrangement. It has to be emphasised that credible exit threats require the availability of 
alternative actors one can switch to, while credible voice threats can only be successful if third 
parties are willing to (re) consider their current and future business with the actor.   
 
 
3. Accounting and control from a contractual perspective 
 
We submit that in a contractual realm accounting serves in designing and using credible 
commitments in order to align interests. Once written down in contracts many of the designed 
credible commitments serve latent functions; they stay in the flank of the relationship until there 
is reason to mobilize them.  In the case that the accounting system is de facto used as a control 
system (for instance, a performance measurement system) it serves as a more or less bureaucratic 
device to provide  (‘ex post’) information within the context of interest alignment.  In this section 
we will examine extant literature on accounting and control in interfirm transactional 
relationships in order to illustrate the roles of accounting and control in a contractual realm. 
 
In his case study of a strategic alliance between NMA Railway Signalling and RIB (a task 
organisation of the Dutch Railways) Dekker (2004) gives evidence of accounting and control in a 
contractual realm. Although predominantly facilitating coordinating requirements contractual 
arrangements serve to align the parties’ interests in such a way that “the alliance contains such 
incentives that, when successful, it provides benefits to both parties” (Dekker, 2004, p. 43).  
In terms of our theoretical modelling there apparently, however small, was legitimate mistrust 
that without a proper institutional arrangement parties could behave opportunistically. A contract 
had to be in place. This is nicely illustrated by a quote of NMA’s managing director (Dekker, 
2004, p. 45): 
 
We wanted to have a sound agreement based on trust, but in which certain issues are arranged 
well, because, in the end, we are not sitting here for our pleasure. And it is nice, those bleu eyes, 
but what if in the future some other blue eyes are sitting over there, what then? And for that 
reason we have put this on paper. 
 
Credible commitments were made in several forms. In terms of the classification of Weesie and 
Raub (1996) they took the form of shifting of control to a ‘third’ party (an alliance board 
consisting of members of each organization), a restriction of the set of behavioural alternatives 
(the protection of proprietary knowledge), a modification of the costs and benefits associated with 
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certain behaviour (a financial incentive system was developed to align the partners’ interests and 
to motivate them to perform adequately) and the balancing of information asymmetry 
(particularly through the board and by open book accounting). Explicit attention was given to the 
risk that RIB could make private use of confidential information by leaking information from 
NMA to other suppliers. However, knowing each other for quite a long time, parties did not 
consider this risk to be very high. This indicates that the contractual arrangement was made 
against the background of trust as it stems from repeated transactions.  
Furthermore, the case study gives evidence that the existence of social networks gives an 
opportunity to economise on transaction costs caused by the design of a control structure. As a 
consequence of RIB’s (the buyer’s) need and intention to initiate more strategic alliances with 
other partners in the future NMA (the system contractor) could trust its partner, because RIB 
would not want to be ‘voiced’ by NMA as a non-trustworthy partner. This institution-based trust 
allowed for a relatively lean formal control structure.  
 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) describe the outsourcing of the information technology and 
telecommunications (IT&T) function at Central Energy, an Australian Company operating in the 
electricity industry. In terms of Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) they find a trust-
based management control pattern in the interfirm transactional relationship.  
Nevertheless, performance indicators were intentionally but gradually established in the name of 
further contract specification. In terms of our theoretical understanding this can be interpreted as 
an attempt to align interests in order to compensate for legitimate mistrust. As task 
programmability and output measurability were low, it proved to be very difficult to reach a 
sufficient level of contract specification at the beginning of the relationship. However, Langfield 
and Smith analyse that among managers at Central there was dissatisfaction with the lack of 
contract specifications (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003, p. 300). In terms of our theoretical 
understanding these managers apparently were of the opinion that too little effort had been made 
to align the interests of the parties and to compensate for legitimate mistrust. Apparently trust, 
especially contractual trust and competence trust stemming from the institutional environment, 
proved to be able to sufficiently compensate for legitimate mistrust and allowed for rather 
unspecified contracts at the beginning of the relationship. But as the relationship matured, task 
programmability and output measurability increased, providing an opportunity for further 
specification of the contract including the design of performance measures and targets.  
 
While Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) report of a movement towards more detailed contract 
specifications, Seal et. al (1999) give evidence of a movement in the opposite direction. They, 
inter alia, study the role of accounting in enacting a supply chain relationship between an 
assembler and its suppliers. Following Rognes (1995) they claim that in interfirm transactional 
relationships frame-agreements are likely to be a first step in the cooperative negotiation, which 
will then develop into more comprehensive partnership-agreements (Seal et. al, p. 318). In terms 
of our theoretical understanding this refers to a development in the contractual realm and, thus, to 
the process of alignment of interests. Yet, in their own case study they conclude that “Parties 
seemed to begin with a rather specific and detailed document, which, over time, became less 
specific in detail but broader in terms of general commitment” (Seal et. al, p. 319). In fact, Seal et 
al. (p. 319) report that at the end of their observation period, there was still no formal open book 
agreement. As Seal et. al (p. 317) state:  
 
“Specific cost reduction targets were no longer in a document but were expected to emerge from 
detailed discussions between multifunctional teams from both companies. Discussions showed a 
willingness to look across company boundaries and allow open-book agreements within pre-
agreed limits” 
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Apparently, self-regulating processes of interaction complemented (and to some extent took the 
place of) a process of contract specification. This reflects a high-trust situation, as is also 
suggested by Mouritsen et. al (2001, p. 225).  
In theoretical terms this non-contractual emergence and use of open-book agreements points to 
limitations of a TCE-view on the management control of interfirm transactional relationships. 
Therefore, in the next section a self-regulating process view is clarified. 
 
 
4. Self-regulating control in interfirm transactional relationships: interaction and 
relational signalling 
 
Actors that have to make decisions on credible commitments are considered to be boundedly 
rational. The conception of bounded rationality within transaction cost economics is one of a 
‘less than perfect’ rationality. It is a weakened form of rationality, as people experience 
limitations in their knowledge and their information-processing capabilities, leading to the 
impossibility of making optimal decisions. It is this interpretation of bounded rationality (‘costly 
bounded rationality’) that gives rise to the notion that decision-making on credible commitments 
is costly (Radner, 2000). In terms of efficiency, writing a complete contract in complex and 
uncertain situations could not only be impossible, but could also be too costly. Therefore, the 
contract will be left incomplete, leading to potential loss of an actor because of opportunism of 
the other actor that cannot be anticipated. But nevertheless, the incomplete contract is the most 
efficient form.  
Lindenberg (2000, p. 15) holds that “the very insistence on being able to use “the tricks in the 
economist’s bag” keeps him (= Williamson, added by authors) (and not just him) from bringing 
in those tools that are necessary to analyse the contractual relationship as a human (emphasis by 
authors) relationship”. Indeed, the instrumental transaction costs economics approach fails to look 
at the relational processes in the transactional relationship. As a consequence of its focus on 
calculativeness and discrete ‘ex ante’ decision making it fails to positively characterize the 
cognitive evolutionary process through which people come to decide and through which 
opportunism in interfirm transactional relationships is mitigated. This is directly linked to the 
reductive interpretation of bounded rationality.  
Characterisation of the cognitive process through which actors decide requires an alternative 
interpretation of bounded rationality, one that is not reductive but positive. Radner (2000) calls 
such a conception one of ‘truly bounded rationality’, as opposed to the reductive ‘costly bounded 
rationality’. The conception of ‘truly bounded rationality’ leads to a “focus on decision 
procedures used by people, since these procedures are showing through their behaviours” 
(Chaserant, 2003, p. 167). It has to account for the real cognitive capacities of people.  
In the real world, people are confronted with fundamental uncertainty, in which it is impossible to 
foresee all possible temptations to behave opportunistically. Therefore, there is a chance of 
unexpected opportunistic behaviour to show up after the contract has been concluded, without an 
available solution ‘ex ante’ written down in the contract. In order to distinguish this type of 
opportunism from the type that has ‘ex ante’ been anticipated by the design of credible 
commitments, this type is labelled myopic opportunism (as opposed to the more strategic form of 
opportunism that can be anticipated) (Lindenberg, 2000; Chaserant, 2003). Myopic opportunism 
is the result of a situation-specific temptation to deviate from the agreement, a temptation that 
derives from short-term incentives to let the self (self-interest) prevail over the long-term 
transactional relationship. As for myopic opportunism, there is no ‘ex ante’ legitimate mistrust.  
 
The important question that follows is: given the central notion of self-interest seeking, do the 
decision procedures in interfirm relations that show through actors’ behaviour prevent 
unanticipated opportunism from occurring?  
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In order to answer this question we will more fully present a process theory of rational 
interaction. This theory essentially brings a trust-generating process between the partners in a 
transactional relationship to the fore. Trust is viewed as a “cognitive state depending on an actor’s 
understanding of the economic relationship he is involved in” (Chaserant, 2003, p. 174).  This 
cognitive state can be viewed as an asset in the relationship, but one that indeed adds to the 
notion of ‘calculated risk’ stemming from a transaction cost approach. It is the result of past 
deliberative behaviour in an ongoing process.  In that process the actors’ search for individual 
gains is transparently weakened by relational considerations and norms of cooperation (the goal 
to act appropriately in the transactional relation and not as a pure ‘homo economicus’). The 
process contains relational signals through which the absence of myopic opportunism is signalled 
(Lindenberg, 2000; Chaserant, 2003). They signal that the sender’s goal is not (only) to seek for 
short-term individual gains, but (also) to conform to norms of cooperation and to preserve the 
relation. The level of trust between partners will increase, as each partner receives more signals 
that the other is willing to invest in the relation. The relational-signal mechanism does not reject 
the importance of self-interest in executing transactions in a transactional relationship, but is 
consistent with it. Only, instruments working on the basis of this mechanism do not have to be 
designed as is the case with credible commitments in preventing or fighting strategic 
opportunism. On the contrary, in a process of rational action in order to mitigate myopic 
opportunism relational signals will be given deliberately and voluntarily by actors, because such 
signals foster their long-term pursuit of self-interest. In such processes, enlightened self interest   
(Chaserant, 2003, p. 165) guides the rationality decisions and actions: the search for individual 
gains is transparently weakened by relational considerations and norms of cooperation.  
Enlightened self-interest gives rise to an actor’s search for individual gain in a certain mixture 
with the search for compliance with cooperative norms.  
The rational trust-generating processes are characterised by deliberation, thus fitting with 
Simon’s notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1987), which essentially is procedural of nature. 
Decisions are not selected because they give the best outcome (‘substantial rationality’), but 
because it stems from an appropriate deliberation process.  In trust-generating processes, the 
deliberation is centred on unforeseen temptations to modify plans ‘along the way’ in order to take 
advantage of a short term opportunity against the actor’s own long-term advantage (temptations 
to myopic opportunism).  To give an example (see also Lindenberg, 2000): an actor, for instance, 
a supplier, could be tempted to fail to conduct rather laborious quality control of his products 
because of time pressure he experiences as a consequence of a sudden spell of unanticipated high 
absenteeism of his personnel. Although the need for quality control itself is not specified in the 
contract, skipping quality control could easily lead to not meeting quality standards that were 
agreed upon, with possible negative long-term consequences for the relationship.  Nevertheless, 
a1though the client trusts the supplier that quality control is performed, skipping quality control 
‘just for one time’ would be in the supplier’s actor’s short term interest.  Or, in another situation, 
a specific, demanding client could create an incentive to give less priority to orders of old clients. 
Of course, one could easily formulate many other examples of these temptations leading to 
deliberation of an actor.  
 
‘Focal goal’ as an essential element in the rational interactive process 
 
According to insights from cognitive social psychology, in an interactive context situation-
specific individual goals prove to be very important if not leading in guiding an ‘actor’s decision 
(for instance, Gollwitzer & Moskiwitz, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996). Of course actors can have many 
goals; some of them will be in the foreground and others will be in the background. Given limited 
cognitive capabilities, the actor cannot give the same amount of attention to every goal. 
Therefore, given a situation the actor will select goals, which are most important to him. He will 
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select a focal goal, while putting the other goals in the background. This phenomenon is called 
framing (Lindenberg, 1988). The main goal or ‘frame’ is determined by the definition of the 
situation and, in turn, also helps to structure the situation, i.e. it helps to find alternative courses of 
action and to discriminate between alternative courses of action. Furthermore, the frame 
mobilizes the norms, knowledge and expectations associated with its pursuit. The frame, 
therefore, not only influences what the actor looks at, but also how he looks at it (Chaserant, 
2003, p. 168). Goals, alternative courses of action and choices are all endogenous and 
simultaneously deliberated on within a process of judgment (a procedure).  
Of course, not only the frame but also the goals in the background will be influential. The degree 
of their influence will depend on the salience of the main goal, e.g. the relative strength of the 
frame to the goals that are in the background.  The less salient the frame gets (the more it 
competes witch goals in the background), the more the choices will also be influenced by the 
goals in the background and vice versa. In case strong competitive goals exist, the frame gets 
precarious.  
Lindenberg (2000) classifies three overarching frames, each of which can contain many sub 
goals.  
A first overarching frame is a gain frame. This frame is concerned with the increase of one’s 
scarce resources, such as money, disposable time etcetera. An actor who is in a salient gain frame 
chooses an action that maximizes his individual gains.  He is seeking self-interest and fits the 
standard figure of the ‘homo economicus’; he will seek for self-interest, even if it requires 
opportunism.  
A second overarching frame is a loss frame. There is asymmetry between gains and losses in the 
sense that losses weight heavier than gains (Kahneman et.al, 1991). Because compared to gains 
losses give rise to strong emotional responses the expectation or experience of a loss immediately 
induces a frame switch towards a loss frame, which aims at preventing or fighting the feeling of 
loss.  Furthermore, the time of a loss frame is relatively short (Loewenstein, 1996).  The higher 
the loss, the stronger the emotion of the actor and the higher the probability of an immediate 
frame switch (Lindenberg, 1993). The emotional strength of a loss frame and its short time 
horizon make it potentially very damaging to a longstanding interfirm transactional relationship; 
actors will do almost anything and in a quick way to avoid or fight losses, even if they have to 
harm their transactional relation and irregardless of the costs that incur to manage the loss. These 
costs are linked to a gain frame, which, once the loss frame has been mobilized, is in the 
background.  It is important to note that such a loss frame will also be mobilized when the non-
realisation of a firmly anticipated gain occurs and leads to a feeling of disruption. Missed ‘golden 
opportunities’ to one of the parties involved, brought in by third parties, can easily lead to shocks 
in ongoing interfirm relationships (Lindenberg, 2000). 
A third overarching frame is a normative frame. Here the goal is ‘to act appropriately’, ‘to do the 
right thing’ (Lindenberg, 2000).  By complying with accepted norms of behaviour the actor is 
seeking social approbation or is trying to preserve the relationship.  Generally speaking, 
normative frames can best be stabilized in groups through rites and rituals and through common 
purpose. Rites, rituals and common purpose influence the salience of the frame by increasing the 
value of the focal goal and by decreasing the value of conflicting background goals. In a 
normative frame, the costs of conformity and the benefits of non-conformity are in the 
background, there being an element in a gain frame. Their influence is, therefore, dependent on 
the salience of the normative frame.  
 
Lindenberg (2000, p. 20) states that the salience of a frame is dependent on two important 
variables: emotional (‘hot’) and instrumental (‘cold’) relevance to ‘self’. For salience, ‘hot’ goals 
are stronger than ‘cool’ goals. His a priory ranking of the three frames in terms of the strength 
vis-à-vis each other is loss frame first, and then gain frame and then normative frame. 
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“ The loss frame is tied more directly to emotions and short-term effects than the other two. 
Increasing one’s own resources (gain frame) is more directly instrumentally relevant to self than 
conformity to norms for the sake of ‘appropriateness’. In order not to be displaced by a loss or a 
gain frame, a normative frame must be stabilized via congruent ‘background’ goals, which, in 
turn, are directly, emotionally and/or instrumentally relevant for self. For example, the 
background of a normative frame can be the valued membership of a group and/or an emotional 
tie to a certain identity (say, a ‘self-respected business man’)” 
 
Actors in a gain frame are seeking self-interest; if they have to, they will not hesitate to behave 
opportunistically. However, the tendency towards myopic opportunism will be mitigated when 
there are conflicting goals (a normative frame) in the background. Such a situation leads to 
enlighten self-interest, a “duality between a gain frame and the willingness to comply with 
cooperative norms’ (Chaserant, 2003, p. 170). Given credible commitments that solve problems 
of legitimate mistrust and thus of potential strategic opportunism, trust will only be generated if 
this myopic opportunism is being accounted for in the daily routines of longer-term interfirm 
relations. 
In order to check for myopic opportunism, relatively strong and stable normative goals are 
especially needed in situations in which detailed monitoring of contract performance is difficult 
and thus costly.  Fortunately, the interaction process between the actors involved can facilitate the 
strength and stability of these normative goals. An actor not only takes an interest in his own 
normative frame, but also in that of his partner. This is mainly due to the damaging consequences 
of a potential loss on framing. As was explained earlier, an actor will do almost anything and in a 
quick way to avoid or fight losses, even if he has to harm the transactional relation and regardless 
of the costs that incur to manage the loss. If he feels confronted with opportunistic behaviour of 
his partner and thus experiences losses, then the continuance of the relationship itself with 
potential long term negative consequences could become at stake. Therefore, given the potential 
consequences each actor will probably like to avoid his partner to switch to a loss frame. Thus, 
each partner takes an interest in stable normative goals and is, therefore, willing to keep his own 
normative goals stable and not to switch to a gain frame.  
This insight leads to the conclusion that the efforts of each actor do not have to be controlled by 
the other. Just by keeping their normative frames stable and by showing trustworthy behaviour, 
actors can avoid the mobilization of loss frames with their damaging potential. Actors can show 
trustworthy behaviour by using relational signals. Another actor will trust an actor if the other 
understands by the signals in the trustee’s behaviour that the trustee has stable cooperative 
behaviour, based on stable normative goals. Therefore, actors will only monitor relational 
signals, thereby economizing on monitoring costs. Here, trust is conceived as a cognitive state 
that generates positive expectations of the intentions and efforts of the other.  
Trust in a transactional relationship can, therefore, be compatible with the seeking of self-interest 
by individual actors. Trust emerges when self-interest is sufficiently enlightened (Chaserant, 
2003). 
 
Actors with salient normative frames in the background will behave sacrificially for the sake of 
the relation. In showing this behaviour they signal commitment to the relationship. According to 
Lindenberg (2000) there are five categories of situations (which are recognizable in any 
cooperative project) asking for such a sacrifice, i.e. asking to follow norms that are appropriate in 
this situation, even if such action is against one’s own interest. It is precisely the following of 
such norms that gives off the relational signals. The first of these ‘solidarity situations’ 
(Lindenberg, 2000, p. 24) is a common good situation. Both partners belong to a group (Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004, referring to Toyota make report of a family); each of the partners will 
cooperatively contribute to the common good, even if he or she could free ride (of course, the 
minimum expected contribution in terms of effort, money etc. can vary in different situations).  
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Second, there is a sharing situation. If one of the partners is in a position to divide joint divisible 
benefits and costs he will not maximize his own gain, but will take a ‘fair share’ (of course, what 
is fair can vary with the specific situation). Third, there is a need situation. In times of need each 
partner will help the other partner (of course, what constitutes need and the minimum amount of 
help that is expected can vary for different situation). Fourth, there is a breach situation. Each 
partner will refrain from hurting the other, even at his own expense (of course, the minimum 
amount of cost expected for solidarity behaviour varies). Fifth, there is a mishap situation. 
Although past actions of a partner were intendedly out of solidarity, they factually did not come 
out that way. In such a situation the actor will explain his intentions to the other actor, he will 
apologize and he will take care of the possible damage his actions caused to the other.  Or, the 
opposite: if an actor knows in advance that for some reason he cannot keep to the agreement, he 
will warn the others in advance, so that they can take measures to mitigate the damage.  
Defection in any one of these five situations points to an instability of the normative frame and 
will harm the trust building process. Such defection will lead the other to a cognitive state in 
which he interprets cooperative behaviour in any of the other situations as ‘strategic’, as coming 
out of a gain frame, though having the appearances of a normative frame. So, the ‘shadow of the 
past’ (Raub and Weesie, 1990) appears to have a strong impact on the level of trust, even more so 
then the ‘shadow of the future’ (see also Blumberg, 2001). 
 
 
5. Accounting and self-regulating control 
 
We submit that in an interactive relational realm accounting serves in self-regulating control. 
Therefore it is part of relational signalling aiming at the alignment of commitments to the 
transactional relationship. 
Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) give strong evidence of accounting playing a major role in self-
regulating control. They show, how a number of observed clusters of interorganisational cost 
management practices are contingent upon observed specific relational contexts. Particularly, 
they distinguish three clusters of interorganisational cost management practices: (1) functionality-
price-quality tradeoffs. FPQ’s are associated with small changes in the designs of the items 
produced, changes that can be initiated and accommodated by a single supplier firm in the supply 
chain; (2) interorganisational cost investigations. Interorganizational cost investigations are 
associated with more significant changes, which require design modifications of the items 
produced or of the production processes by more than one firm in the chain; and (3) concurrent 
cost management. The latter has to do with very substantial changes in designs of the items 
produced by the interacting firms, frequently leading to the necessity for both the buyer’s and the 
supplier’s products to be modified in a compatible fashion. Therefore, in many cases the design 
changes have to be engineered simultaneously, or, if there is parallel engineering, buyer and 
supplier have to provide each other with sufficient information.  
The three clusters of practices are associated with three observed specific relational contexts. 
Using the terminology of one of the companies involved, Cooper and Slagmulder define these 
contexts as, (a) a context of ‘family members’. This context consists of a buyer and a number of 
suppliers that have a very high ‘design dependence’, i.e. they establish joint specifications and 
take joint responsibility for product design; (b) a context of ‘major suppliers’. This context 
consists of a buyer and a number of suppliers with less design dependence; the suppliers are not 
held responsible for the functional design specifications of the items, only for the technical 
designs of the items they supplied; and (c) a context of ‘subcontractors’. Subcontractors 
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manufacture outsourced items that are designed by the buyer, they are typically highly skilled at 
manufacturing specialized items. 1
 
The Cooper & Slagmulder paper gives evidence that the nature of the accounting system (cost 
management system) is contingent upon the relational context. In fact, by the description of a 
context of ‘family’ and ‘friendship’ in interfirm relationships they challenge Williamsons’ 
assertion that trust and calculativeness belong to distinct relational areas. 
Interorganizational cost investigations (observed in a context of major suppliers) have a higher 
ability to improve cooperative behaviour than functionality-price-quality tradeoffs in a context of 
subcontracting (their ‘solidarity character’ is higher), while concurrent cost management as 
observed in a family context has the highest ‘solidarity’ character. In the family context a good 
cooperative relationship is maintained and trust is built. Apparently, partners mobilize strong 
normative frames. They generated ‘goodwill trust’ (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004, p 18): 
 
”Both sides (i.e. the buyer, Komatsu, and the supplier, Toyo) viewed the new relationship as akin 
to a strong friendship, an example of a self-enforcing safeguard that reduces the need for legal 
and other formal protection mechanisms” 
 
The concurrent cost management system did not only passively reflect the family character and 
thus the existence of normative frames, but actively signals trustworthy behaviour. The paper 
(p.17) gives a quote of the words of the buyer’s purchasing manager that can exemplify this (the 
quote representing a common good situation and a sharing situation): 
 
“Sometimes our sharing of cost information, coupled to our knowledge of Toyo’s (supplier) 
profits, can lead to a conflict of interest, with pressure building within Komatsu to reduce target 
costs where Toyo’s profits are known to be high. However, we share common goal-getting costs 
as low as possible-, which ensures that these conflicts rarely become serious. To reduce the 
incidence of such conflicts, we do not set our target costs for parts manufactured by Toyo based 
upon our knowledge of Toyo’s costs. Instead, we try to set our target costs independently of Toyo 
and let Toyo make as much profit as possible”. 
 
Cooper and Slagmulder’s paper also gives evidence that the normative frames are somehow 
balanced with gain frames, which in this family context are expected to be less salient. The paper 
gives a quote that reflects the existence of credible exit threats (p.18):  
 
“More specifically, Toyo had access to Komatsu’s future product plans, which contained highly 
valuable information for Komatsu’s competitors. However, Komatsu in turn had access to highly 
proprietary information about Toyo and, if Toyo were to defect, Komatsu could retaliate by 
sharing that information with Toyo’s competitors” 
 
 
Dekker’s study into the control of a strategic alliance between NMA Railway Signalling and RIB 
(a task organisation of the Dutch Railways) (Dekker, 2004) also gives evidence of relational 
signalling.  In the contact phase, before the contractual arrangements were concluded, NMA (the 
                                                 
1 Cooper & Slagmulder also mention a fourth context: a context of common suppliers. These suppliers 
supply catalogues products; there is no design dependence between the buyer and the supplier. Because of 
the lack of dependence between buyer and seller, there is a transactional relationship that is mainly 
governed by a market mechanism. These ‘arm’s-length relationships’ are not accompanied by any form of 
interorganizational cost management system. That is, there is no sign of either a instrumental control use of 
cost management practices nor of a more ‘solidarity’-use of such a system. 
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potential system contractor) signalled trustworthy behaviour by allowing RIB detailed insights 
into the cost structure of the product, including profit margins. In doing so, NMA signalled that it 
trusted RIB, because given the lack of institutional arrangements RIB still would have the 
opportunity to switch to other parties, opportunistically using the information it had collected 
from NMA. As Dekker notes “this risk taking behaviour and RIB’s reciprocating behaviour 
further nurtured relational trust and speeded up negotiations and the design of the contract 
significantly” (Dekker (2004, p. 45). 
Apparently not only the relational signalling in the contact phase facilitated the further trust 
building in later stages of the relationship, but also the contractual arrangements themselves were 
placed in the context of trust building. This gives evidence that an institutional arrangement not 
only serves an instrumental function in attenuating potential strategic opportunistic behaviour, but 
indeed also facilitates relational signalling in the course of the relationship.  Partners emphasised 
that the use of formal controls (such as goal sharing and performance measurement) helped to 
create mutual transparency, which they found to be an important basis of their relationship. So, 
the formal controls were not placed in a ‘bureaucratic’ context aiming at the generation of ‘ex 
post’ monitoring information with a strong emphasis on accountability, but in a context of a 
‘common good’ situation and a context of information sharing, for instance, for purposes of 
allocation of costs and benefits. In case ‘ex post’ measurement was necessary, for instance, to 
measure cost reductions in operating and maintenance activities, ‘the negotiation of a reasonable 
estimate’ (Dekker, 2004, p. 46) was put in place, signalling trust in each other. 
Furthermore, the case description gives evidence that there is intentional incomplete contracting 
signalling trust in each other that in the course of the relationship adequate adjustments to 
changes in circumstances would be made. Apparently, contracts allowed for procedural 
rationality. 
 
 
6. Linkages between socially embedded instrumental design and trust building at the level 
of the relationship  
 
Relational signals have the potential to regulate the relationship and to mitigate opportunism. 
However, given legitimate mistrust, it cannot compensate for potential strategic opportunism. To 
compensate for legitimate mistrust, ‘flanking arrangements of cooperation’ (Lindenberg, 1998) 
have to be in place. An important flanking institutional arrangement is the contract, which 
facilitates the design of credible commitments for mitigating strategic opportunism. In turn, the 
contracts are flanked by social network and by a wider institutional environment and atmosphere. 
 
The writing of contracts and the subsequent implementation and use of formal control devices 
have to be avoided if there is no legitimate mistrust. This is a direct consequence following from 
TCE, as the design and use of unnecessary costly institutional arrangements are inefficient. 
Moreover, there are also indirect costs involved. In criticising TCE for its assumption that 
organizations exist because of their ability to attenuate opportunism through control Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996) give evidence that the use of formal (hierarchical) control devices not only can 
have positive consequences in terms of attenuating opportunistic behaviour, but also can have 
negative consequences in terms of an increased proclivity to behave opportunistically. The latter 
is the result of a more negative disposition and attitude towards the organization and the 
transaction partner that emerges as a consequence of the implementation and use of formal 
control devices. There is convincing empirical evidence (e.g. Enzle and Anderson, 1993) that 
formal control reduces the intrinsic motivation and the commitment towards the organization.  
In the context of a transactional relationship this would imply that particularly in situations which 
lack legitimate mistrust the design and use of credible commitments and credible exit threats have 
to be avoided for the sake of appropriate non-opportunistic behaviour in the relationship. If at the 
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start partners in such a transactional relationship have relatively strong normative frames and thus 
a very cooperative attitude, they might perceive the writing, implementation and use of credible 
commitments as a ‘loss’ of cooperative norms. Therefore, they might change the precarious 
balance of their frames into the direction of a gain frame, thus negatively influencing the 
cooperative relation.  
But, on the other hand, if there is legitimate mistrust but no socially embedded formal control 
structure to compensate for it, the lack of institutional arrangements will prohibit the trust 
building process because in the actors’ eyes interests are inadequately aligned.  Ergo, in situations 
of legitimate mistrust the embeddedness of the relational process in institutional arrangements 
then is a conditio sine qua non.  
 
It seems that Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) provide contra-evidence for the assumed 
negative correlation between formal controls and trust building. In studying the outsourcing of IT 
& T at Central Energy they state: “Interestingly, goodwill trust continued to exist, and may even 
have strengthened, in the face of the development of more rigid performance expectations and the 
development of contract specifications” (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003, p. 304). Performance 
indicators at the relationship were intentionally established in the name of further contract 
specification.  
Although in terms of our theoretical understanding this further specification should be primarily 
placed in the context of interest alignment and the compensation for legitimate mistrust, the 
process of further specification (the design activity) in this relationship apparently coincides with 
trust building in an interactive context of familiarity. Thus, the process of contract specification is 
a vehicle for relational signalling. The process of interest alignment then coincides with the 
process of alignment of commitment. The contractual is linked with the relational.  
Looking through our theoretical lens it would be interesting to know whether the further 
specification only serves to have instruments put in place in the flank; instruments that only 
latently come into action. Or, reversibly, whether the further specification also leads to an 
instrumental and bureaucratic use of controls, thus linking the contractual to the operational.  If 
the latter is true, then indeed the further specification could signify a movement away from the 
trust-based pattern of control towards a bureaucracy-based pattern of control, as Langfield-Smith 
and Smith (2003, p. 299) are stating. But if the further specifications are predominantly used to 
create mutual transparency and are not used in an instrumental way (comparable to what Dekker 
(2004) found in his study) we submit that then the control pattern remains to be trust-based. The 
contract specifications then help to construct a ‘common good’ situation and to create a context of 
information sharing, for instance, for purposes of allocation of costs and benefits.  Viewed from 
this perspective more detailed specification of contracts and more ‘formal’ contractually based 
accounting might indeed “contribute positively to the transactional atmosphere of the 
relationship” (Seal et. al, 1999) and, therefore, not conflict with the building of trust, as 
Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003, p. 300) suggest.   
However, this does not refute our argument that the implementation and use of formal control 
devices might reduce the commitment towards the interfirm transactional relationship. It is the 
way the accounting tools and information is used (or is intended to be used) that we submit to be 
decisive for the relationship between commitment and control, not the process of writing 
contracts and the concluding of contracts per se. 
 
 
7. Accounting in the management control of interfirm transactional relationships: the 
main contribution to the debate 
 
Our main case proposition stemming from the analysis so far is twofold. First, in addition to its 
roles in the coordination of activities (the operational realm), accounting can play functional as 
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well as constitutive roles in a contractual realm and in an interactive relational realm. Second, the 
accounting functions in the three realms are interrelated.  
In a contractual realm accounting serves in designing and using credible commitments and 
credible exit threats in order to align interests. Once written down in contracts many of the 
designed credible commitments and credible exit threats serve latent functions; they stay in the 
flank of the relationship until there is reason to mobilize them.  In case the accounting system is 
de facto used as a control system (for instance a performance measurement system) it serves as a 
more or less bureaucratic device to provide  (‘ex post’) information within the context of interest 
alignment.   
In an interactive relational context accounting supports relational signalling in order to align 
commitments. In an operational context (in terms of Tomkins (2001) the ‘mastering of events’) 
accounting serves as a motivational decision support and control device in order to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the activities within the transactional relationship. The legitimacy 
for an operational use of accounting and control systems can both stem from the contractual 
arrangement and thus have a formal base, or from self-regulating rational interactive processes. 
 
There are some important differences between accounting for the alignment of interest, 
accounting for the alignment of commitment and accounting for the coordination of activities. A 
first difference concerns the power/legitimacy base for the use of accounting. The 
power/legitimacy for its use for the alignment of interest stems from a formal contractual base. 
The power for its use for the alignment of commitment stems from trust built at the level of the 
transactional relationship. And the power/legitimacy for the coordination of activities can have a 
formal contractual base as well as an informal trust base. Second, the aims of accounting in the 
three realms differ. They range from preventing strategic opportunism from occurring via 
preventing myopic opportunism from occurring to coordinating activities in the operational 
realm. Third, there is a difference in emphasis on objects. Accounting for alignment of interest 
emphasises the (results of) the behaviour of specific human actors, accounting for alignment of 
commitment emphasises the relation between human actors and accounting for coordination 
emphasises the activities. Fourth, accounting for the alignment of interest is the result of 
intentional instrumental design, whereas accounting for alignment of commitment is emergent 
and self-regulating. Accounting for the coordination of activities can be both. This implies, fifth, 
that for alignment of interest there is more or less formal information processing, whilst for the 
alignment of commitment there is interactive information sharing (accounting for the 
coordination of activities can have both). Sixth, drawing upon the distinction between ‘ex ante’ 
and ‘ex post’-information, accounting for the alignment of interest can ‘ex ante’ serve 
incentivization and the balancing of information, while accounting for the alignment of 
commitment can ‘ex ante’ direct attention towards a need situation and/or can be of assistance in 
joint problem solving. For coordination of activities accounting can ‘ex ante’ serve functions of 
attention direction, planning and/or problem solving. Seventh, after the events (‘ex post’) 
accounting serves accountability purposes in the contractual realm, whereas in the relational 
realm in order to align commitment accounting serves to share information for allocation 
purposes and/or to account for a mishap. For the coordination of activities accounting can be of 
help as a measurement- and evaluation device. 
Essentially, eight, accounting for the alignment of interest is part of a system of behavioural 
control or output control and accounting for the alignment of commitment is part of a trust 
building process. Accounting for the coordination of activities is part of an operational 
information system that serves to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities at 
hand. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the main differences between accounting for the alignment of interest, 
accounting for the alignment of commitment and accounting for coordination of activities: 
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Accounting for alignment of 
interest 
Accounting for alignment of 
commitment 
Accounting for 
coordination of activities  
Contract-based Trust-based Contract and/or trust 
based 
Aims to prevent strategic 
opportunism 
Aims to prevent myopic 
opportunism 
Aims to coordinate 
activities 
Emphasis on human actors Emphasis on relations  Emphasis on activities  
Instrumental design  Emergent and self regulating Instrumental design and/or 
emergent and self 
regulating 
Formal information processing  Interactive information sharing Interactive information 
sharing and/or formal 
information processing. 
Incentivization and balancing 
information (‘ex ante’)   
Attention direction to a need 
situation and/or joint problem 
solving (‘ex ante’)  
Attention direction, 
planning and/or problem 
solving (‘ex ante’) 
Accountability (‘ex post’) Sharing information for 
allocation purposes and/or 
accounting for a mishap (‘ex 
post’) 
Measurement and 
evaluation (‘ex post’) 
Meeting standards in behavioural 
control and/or output control 
Trust building in the 
relationship 
Enhancing effectiveness 
and efficiency of activities 
Figure 1: accounting for alignment of interests, alignment of commitments and coordination of 
activities 
 
In distinguishing three types of accounting information in interfirm transactional relationships we 
add to the distinction made by Tomkins (2001). Tomkins (2001, p. 171) distinguishes information 
that relates to the willingness to trust (‘type 1’-information) from information needed for the 
‘mastery of events’ (‘type 2’-information). Our analysis suggests that a third type of information 
can be distinguished: information that relates to contractual instrumental design (‘type 3’-
information). 
 
Tomkins (2001) proposed a debate on the interaction between trust and information and, 
accounting information being part of that information, between trust and accounting. As trust and 
the provision of (accounting) information are both uncertainty absorbing mechanisms he claims 
that controllers and management accountants could benefit from a well developed theory on how 
the provision of (accounting) information needs to take into account the trust that exists and is 
gradually further built in a transactional relationship. In his view such a theory should go beyond 
the simple static inverse relationship between the willingness to trust and information need, as 
Wicks et al. (1999) suggest. Therefore, Tomkins adopts a dynamic process view. While 
acknowledging that trust is contextually dependent on culture and personal propensities, in 
Tomkins’ view trust derives from “learned, usually interactive, experiences” (Tomkins, 2001, p. 
168). Over the lifecycle of a relationship the association between trust and information is 
characterized by an inverted U-shape (Tomkins, 2001, p. 170).  In the beginning of a relationship 
there will be a relatively low need for either trust or information as the “risks attached to breach 
of commitment are lower than at later stages of the relationship” (Tomkins, 2001, p. 170). As the 
relationship matures trust and the provision of information will be positively associated, the latter 
being necessary to build the former. From a certain level of trust the information flow will 
gradually congeal.  
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Tomkins explicitly places the provision of information in the context of ‘control’.  Uncertainty 
can be absorbed “either by building higher levels of trust or by building more extensive control 
mechanisms with the associated increase in information” (2001, p. 167).  So, for Tomkins in a 
dynamic sense trust building is intertwined with control. We claim that his analysis can be further 
refined. Information in the context of (formal) control is primarily associated with contractual 
arrangements between parties and thus with the alignment of interests, while trust is primarily 
associated with information in the context of relational signaling and thus with the alignment of 
commitments. Therefore, trust is primarily associated with type 1-information, whereas more 
formal control is associated with type 3-information. To the extent that empirical evidence for the 
‘U-shape’ curve can be found, we submit that it is evidence for the relationship between trust and 
type1- information, i.e. trust and relational signaling.  This is not to say that there is no 
association between trust and type 3-information, i.e. trust and control. The association between 
trust and control is twofold. First, as was suggested before, used in a bureaucratic way formal 
control could reduce commitment towards the relationship and, therefore, negatively effect the 
level of trust. This would lead to trust being negatively associated with the provision of type 3-
information. Second, given our analysis there is an indirect association between trust and control 
information. Legitimate institutional arrangements (e.g. contractual arrangements and 
arrangements in the institutional environment of the relationship) and the provision of 
information that follows from them will be prerequisites for the trust building process to develop. 
So, the level of trust is conditional upon an information flow that serves to compensate for 
legitimate mistrust.  
Referring to Macaulay (1963; 1985) and Vincent-Jones (1985) Tomkins (2001, p. 177) views 
contracts predominantly as planning and coordinating devices rather than control devices. We 
agree that the significance of contractual arrangements for attenuating appropriation concerns 
should not be overstated and even analyzed, too much of its de facto use could harm the 
cooperation in the relationship. However, we also argued that a lack of legitimate institutional 
arrangements could prevent a trust building process from developing. 
 
We submit that the three types of information are connected to three distinct managerial areas. 
Agreeing with Tomkins (2001) that professional controllers and management accountants could 
benefit from the development of theory our analysis indicates that controllers would want to make 
a distinction between the three managerial areas and their related needs for (accounting) 
information.  In a contractual realm controllers could help in designing, implementing and using 
accounting systems. Furthermore, they could safeguard against an overemphasis as well as 
against an under-emphasis on instrumental design and implementation. In a relational realm they 
are assumed to have a more occasional role in providing information for relational signalling. In 
an operational realm they could assist in providing decision-oriented information as well as 
control information regarding the execution of activities. 
 
 
8. Conclusions and discussion 
 
At the core of an interfirm transactional relationship there is interaction. The cognitive drivers of 
this interaction are dependant upon the individual goal(s) of the parties at hand. The analysis 
starts form the assumption that in an economic relationship each party seeks for individual gain; 
their focal goal is individual gain.  Therefore, a gain frame will heavily influence the way a party 
defines the relationship he or she is involved in respectively, and the way he or she acts in the 
relationship. Economic theory, especially transaction cost economics, states that the search for 
individual gain could be accompanied by opportunism: in order to find and collect individual 
gain, each party could be tempted to cheat or to lie to the other party (parties). Drawing on a 
process theory of rational interaction we claim that as long as each party positively values the 
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economic relationship he or she will also feel the necessity to show cooperative behaviour and to 
suppress temptations for opportunism. Or to put it differently: he or she is aware of the necessity 
to transparently signal cooperative behaviour in which opportunism is eliminated. 
Parties that explicitly signal cooperative behaviour (i.e. parties that act appropriate) have 
relatively strong cooperative frames in the background, leading to less salient gain frames and, 
therefore, too little opportunistic behaviour. The interactive process of relational signalling will 
lead to trust, which in this context is viewed as a cognitive state resulting from past behaviour. 
Trust, so to say, is the ‘shadow of the past’ resulting from an interactive process in which parties 
draw on procedural rationality. This ‘shadow’ gives rise to expectations that the other party will 
continue to behave cooperatively and non-opportunistically during the remainder of the 
relationship.  
Accounting proves to be able to serve an important function in relational signalling and thus in 
building trust. It generates information in order to (jointly) solve problems, to share information 
for allocation purposes, to be co-operative and supporting in a need-situation or to account for a 
mishap.  
Using second-hand data some anecdotal empirical evidence of a relational signalling function of 
accounting was given related to contractual arrangements and the institutional environment.  
 
The building of trust as it is described above rests on back-looking mechanisms: parties come to 
trust each other by looking back to the cooperative behaviour they showed.  To be more precise, 
the building of trust is the result of monitoring the relational signals. However, this building of 
trust necessarily has to be flanked by forward-looking instrumental design.  At certain points in 
time ‘farsighted’ parties will also look forward and discern potential problems of strategic 
opportunism, and factor these back into instrumental design in the form of credible commitments. 
In doing so, they try to compensate for legitimate mistrust which is present in case breach of the 
relationship would be ‘blatantly in the self-interest’ of one of the parties. We argued that the 
presence of legitimate mistrust that is not compensated for stands in the way of the interactive 
building of trust.  Credible commitments serve a function to align interests by changing the 
incentives in such a way that breach of the relationship would not be ‘blatantly in the self-interest 
of a party’ (Lindenberg, 2000, p. 12). Given uncertainty and bounded rationality, credible 
commitments in the context of contracts are always incomplete and, therefore, not easily 
enforceable. Nevertheless, according to TCE they are able to contain the most efficient means to 
prevent or fight strategic opportunism.  
Just as accounting can serve a function in the building of trust, it can also serve a function in 
compensating for legitimate mistrust. For instance, formal performance measurement and the 
linkage of payments to performance can help in diminishing mistrust. Such a (potential) use of 
accounting tools necessarily flanks a relational and an operational context in which a rational 
process of (inter) action is evolving.  Furthermore, the contractual function and the relational 
function of accounting prove to be interrelated. 
 
Prior to contracting there has to be a certain level of trust. As is clearly illustrated by the evidence 
from a number of studies  (e.g. Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004) trust building 
processes in a transactional relationship may precede the concluding of institutional 
arrangements. Furthermore, instrumental contractual design is in itself a process embedded in an 
institutional environment consisting of organizational networks, markets, law, social values and 
norms. This institutional environment can be an important source of trust. This institution-based 
trust has the potential to prevent strategic opportunism occurring. Therefore, it directly influences 
the efficient design and potential use of credible commitments (including formal controls). The 
paper illustrated this with some case study results. Apparently, in their function to create 
safeguards against future opportunistic behaviours contracts incorporate a level of trust that was 
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generated from the past and/or from the institutional environment in which the contractual 
arrangements are made. 
Finally, examination of case study material illustrated that contractual arrangements not only 
serve to compensate for legitimate mistrust, but that they also can facilitate trust building and the 
relational signalling that accompanies it. Moreover they serve future operational management by 
allowing for procedural rationality in coordinating activities.  They do this by creating conditions 
for future trust-building processes and relational signalling to develop and for coordination and 
adaptation in the course of the relationship. Conversely, trust building processes prove to be able 
to facilitate the writing of contracts.  Therefore, a TCE-view on contracts proves to be too narrow 
and too static a view for understanding control in interfirm transactional relationships. In this 
respect, the TCE-view on the control of interfirm transactional relationships is suggested as 
becoming embedded in a process view of rational interaction. 
 
The analysis in this paper opens up possibilities for future research. First, future research could 
reveal empirical (contra) evidence for the use of accounting for the alignment of commitment. Of 
particular interest would be to know whether a bureaucratic use of contractual arrangements in a 
transactional relationship has negative consequences for the cooperative behaviour of the parties 
involved. Do parties in such a relationship indeed have more salient gain frames and do they thus 
give more evidence of myopic opportunism than parties in a relationship with a relatively strong 
relational focus?  
Furthermore, although we agree with Tomkins (2001) that in an analytical sense operational 
information can be distinguished from relational information but can hardly be separated from it 
in practice, we feel it would be useful to do some empirical research into the degree to which 
relationship-management is separated from operations management and into the way separate 
information flows are connected to these different areas of management. Moreover it would be 
interesting to do future research into the dynamic links between the operational, the relational and 
the contractual realms. 
Finally, we think it useful to do research into the roles of management accountants in designing 
and implementing institutional arrangements as well as in relational signalling. In doing so we 
will also achieve a more elaborated view on the roles of accounting information.  
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